Design-Time Quantification of Integrity in Cyber-Physical-Systems by Morris, Eric Rothstein et al.
Design-TimeQuantification of Integrity in
Cyber-Physical-Systems
Eric Rothstein Morris, Carlos G. Murguia, Martín Ochoa
Singapore University of Technology and Design
eric_rothstein,murguia_rendon,martin_ochoa@sutd.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
In a software system it is possible to quantify the amount of in-
formation that is leaked or corrupted by analysing the flows of
information present in the source code. In a cyber-physical sys-
tem, information flows are not only present at the digital level, but
also at a physical level, and to and fro the two levels. In this work,
we provide a methodology to formally analyse a Cyber-Physical
System composite model (combining physics and control) using
an information flow-theoretic approach. We use this approach to
quantify the level of vulnerability of a system with respect to at-
tackers with different capabilities. We illustrate our approach by
means of a water distribution case study.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Formal security models; Logic and
verification; Information flow control;
KEYWORDS
Information Flow, Cyber-physical Systems, Control Theory, Non-
interference
1 INTRODUCTION
A cyber-physical system (CPS) is a system that intertwines com-
ponents from the physical and digital worlds. Some examples of
CPSs include: cars, aircrafts, water treatment plants, industrial con-
trol systems, and critical infrastructures. Security violations in a
safety-critical CPS has notable effects in the physical world, e.g.,
in late 2007 or early 2008, the Stuxnet attack against an Iranian
control system allegedly sabotaged centrifuges in uranium enrich-
ment plants, causing them to rapidly deteriorate [1, 32], and in 2014,
hackers struck a steel mill in Germany and disrupted the control
system, which prevented a blast furnace from properly shutting
down, causing massive damage to the facility [2, 3].
Although in the scientific literature on information security con-
fidentiality has traditionally enjoyed more attention than integrity,
as observed for instance by Clark and Wilson [16]: “in the com-
mercial environment, preventing disclosure is often important, but
preventing unauthorized data modification is usually paramount.”
This holds particularly true for many Industrial Control Systems
(ICSs) at yet another level: their security priority is not the pro-
tection of confidential data, but the protection of their physical
assets. Gollmann and Krotofil reinforce this paradigm in [26], stat-
ing that the traditional CIA (Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability)
triad should be reversed when studying the security of CPSs. They
argue that the enforcement of integrity in CPSs should not only
consider the “traditional approach for IT systems”, i.e., protecting
component logic and communication, but that we must also protect
the integrity of observations; more precisely, we have to protect
the veracity of sensor data and check its plausibility.
Traditionally, the enforcement of CPS integrity has focused on
guaranteeing that systems perform as their designers intended. This
is usually evaluated using control-theoretic methodologies, specifi-
cally fault-detection techniques. Control theory researchers model
attacks to CPSs as time-series with specific structures affecting
sensor measurements and/or control signals. Depending on their
capabilities, attackers have the power to control when, where, and
how attacks are induced to the system. Research on attack detec-
tion and mitigation has mainly focused on the so-called integrity
attacks, i.e., attacks that put at risk the proper operation and physi-
cal integrity of CPSs. Integrity attacks include stealthy attacks [19],
message replay [36], covert attacks [50], and false-data injection
[37], among others. Due to their focus on fault-detection techniques,
many results based on control theory aim to protect CPSs from
integrity attacks by relying on monitoring the physics of the system
to detect anomalies (see, e.g., [5, 13, 35, 38, 44, 52]).
In sum, most control-theoretical approaches to CPS security
assume the existence of a probabilistic behavioural model that
is used as a “white-list” of normal behaviour (attack-free), and
their goal is to monitor and protect the integrity of the system
with respect to this ideal model at runtime, when attacks might
arise. There are some limitations with this approach. On the one
hand, most of the work following this approach is reactive, and
as such it does not shed light on how to improve a given CPSs
design in order to make it more resilient to attacks (although there
are some recent results on redesigning controllers and models to
improve robustness of CPSs against attacks, e.g., [42, 55]). On the
other hand, an inherent limitation of many behavioural models
for CPS is that they usually are approximate due to linearisation,
and might produce a high false positive rate when used in practice;
also, many works (e.g., [35, 52, 56]) rely on the assumption that it
is possible to determine whether the system is operating normally
or under attack, but there could be non-malicious deviations of a
given behavioural model due to routine maintenance operations
or other random factors. Moreover, only few approaches (such as
[9, 42, 56]) quantify the severity and consequences of attacks on
the system.
Information flow analysis (IFA) has traditionally focused on de-
termining whether sensitive/secret information flows to where it
is not intended to. There is a large body of literature on the appli-
cation of IFA for the attestation of data confidentiality, including
[11, 15, 20], among others. Although it is well known that concep-
tually integrity can be seen as the dual of confidentiality, arguably
the attestation of integrity has not received much attention from
the IFA community. We thus suggest, as an interesting application
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scenario of IFA, to develop an alternative and complementary ap-
proach to control theory to reason about CPS security based on
well-known computer science foundations for integrity. We make
the fundamental observation that in practice we often want to pro-
tect the integrity of the state of a (physical) process variable (i.e.
the level of water of a tank, the temperature of a certain device
or material, the chemical concentration of a given medium etc.).
We propose then to model a CPS as the composition of a cyber
(digital) state-machine modelling the controller logic, and the cor-
responding expected physical world reaction. In this setting we
can apply information-flow inspired definitions and techniques to
formally assess and quantify the effects of an attacker controlling
certain aspects of the system (sensors, actuators, or communication
channels) on the critical physical variables we intend to protect.
Although our approach can shed light on the dependencies be-
tween certain inputs and certain critical physical states of the sys-
tem, we remark that our analysis assumes some reasonable limi-
tations on the considered attackers. In particular, we assume that
attackers control only a subset of sensors/actuators and that at-
tackers do not subvert the controller’s logic. Clearly, if attackers
control all sensors and actuators or are able to replace the control
logic (as in the case of Stuxnet), then they can drive a CPS to any
desired state (unless orthogonal controls are in place). However,
we believe that the analysis proposed in this work can be useful to
decide where and if to include redundancy in the number of sensors
and/or in the control logic, in order to make attacks more difficult
to perform.
Given that our approach is intended to verify the security of
CPSs at design-time, we make assumptions that might be unre-
alistic when considered in an approach that monitors security at
runtime (in particular, we assume that we know the state of the
controller and of the physical process). Nevertheless, we consider
our assumptions to be realistic at design-time, given the existence
of a models that describe the dynamical systems (where states are
explicitly described), and given the existence of a state machine that
models the controller (where the current state is usually known).
Problem statement: To summarize, in this work we address the
following questions: Can we identify at design time which inputs to
a CPS are most harmful if controlled by an attacker? Can we improve
the design of the CPS at design time and justify our models formally
with respect to a precise integrity notion?
Approach:We propose to model a CPS as a composition of the
control logic and the expected systems behaviour in terms of a finite
and deterministic state machine. We then formally quantify the
impact of various attackers (controlling physical or logical aspects
of the system) to the integrity of critical physical states by means
of information flow analysis.
Contributions: We make the following contributions a) We
present a logical framework to formally reason about integrity
in CPS models, reconciling information flow analysis and control
theoretical aspects. b)We discuss how our approach can be used to
spot and quantify harmful information flows in CPS. c)We illustrate
the usefulness of our approach by means of simple but realistic
models concerning a water distribution CPS and show that we can
identify non-trivial integrity-harming flows in a CPS.
2 CONTROL THEORY PRELIMINARIES
Gollmann and Krotofil highlight in [26] that “to work on cyber-
physical systems, one has to combine the devious mind of the
security expert with the technical expertise of the control engineer.”
Unfortunately, this expertise is “not commonly found in the IT se-
curity community,” according to the authors of [25]. Moreover, this
lack of expertise is worsened by the language barrier between the
disciplines of control theory and IT security. Thus, in this section,
we present the model-based techniques for CPSs security broadly
used by the systems and control community.
2.1 Linear Time-Invariant Models.
During the last decade, there has been an increasing tendency
to use physics-based models of CPSs to detect and quantify the
effect of attacks on the system performance [13, 35, 38–40, 42, 52].
These physics-based models focus on the normal operation of the
CPS and work as prediction models that are used to confirm that
control commands and measurements are valid and plausible. Often,
dynamical models of physical systems are approximated around
their operation points or approximated using input-output data.
These lead to approximated models which are often linear and
time-invariant.
Following the work in [13, 35, 38–40, 42, 52], here, we only
consider Linear-Time Invariant (LTI) models, although the same
ideas are employed when considering more complicated dynamics.
In particular, a model of a CPS that uses LTI stochastic difference
equations is of the form{
x(tk+1) = Ax(tk ) + Bu(tk ) +v(tk ),
y(tk ) = Cx(tk ) + η(tk ),
(1)
with k ∈ N, sampling time-instant tk , physical state of the sys-
tem x ∈ Rn (i.e., an n-dimentional vector of physical variables
associated with the dynamics of the CPS), sensor measurements
y := (y1, . . . ,ym )T ∈ Rm , control signals u := (u1, . . . ,um )T ∈ Rl ,
real-valued matrices A, B, and C of appropriate dimensions, and
i.i.d. multivariate zero-mean Gaussian noises v ∈ Rn and η ∈ Rm
with covariance matrices R1 ∈ Rn×n and R2 ∈ Rm×m , respectively.
The matrixA describes the dynamic evolution of the physical process,
B is used to model the effect of actuators on the system dynamics,
and the matrix C models the part of the state xk available from
sensor measurements.
2.2 Attacks on Models
At the time-instants tk ,k ∈ N, the output of the process y(tk )
is sampled and transmitted over a communication network. The
received output is used to compute control actions u(tk ) which
are sent back to the physical process. The complete control-loop
is assumed to be performed instantaneously, i.e., the sampling,
transmission, and arrival time-instants are supposed to be equal.
In between transmission and reception of sensor data and control
commands, an attacker may replace the signals coming from the
sensors to the controller and from the controller to the actuators,
acting as a Man-in-the-Middle. Thus, after each transmission and
2
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reception, the attacked output y¯ and attacked input u¯ take the form{
y¯(tk ) := y(tk ) + δy (tk ),
u¯(tk ) := u(tk ) + δu (tk ),
(2)
where δy (tk ) ∈ Rm and δu (tk ) ∈ Rl denote additive sensor and
actuator attacks, respectively.
Henceforth, we denote x(tk ) by xk , u¯(tk ) by u¯k , v(tk ) by vk ,
y¯(tk ) by y¯k , η(tk ) by ηk , δy (tk ) by δyk , and δu (tk ) by δuk . Then, a
system under attack is modelled by{
xk+1 = Axk + B(uk + δuk ) +vk ,
y¯k = Cxk + ηk + δ
y
k .
(3)
2.3 State Estimation
The vast majority of work on attack detection uses fault detection
techniques [14, 31] to identify attacks. The main idea behind fault
detection theory is the use of an estimator to forecast the evolution
of the system. If the difference between what it is measured and the
estimation is larger than expected, then there may be a fault/attack
on the system.
For LTI CPSs of the form (1), to estimate the state of the physical
process, people from the systems and control community usemainly
two types of estimators: the Kalman filter [8] and the Luenberger
observer [33]. Here, we consider Luenberger observers of the form{
xˆk+1 = Axˆk + Bu¯k + L
(
y¯k −Cxˆk
)
,
yˆk = Cxˆk ,
(4)
with estimated state xˆk ∈ Rn and observer gain matrix L ∈ Rn×m
which must be designed to ensure that the estimated state xˆk con-
verges to the actual state xk asymptotically, i.e., L is selected such
that limk→∞(xk −xˆk ) = 0. Define the estimation error ek := xk −xˆk
and the residual sequence rk ∈ Rm as
rk := y¯k −Cxˆk = Cek + ηk + δyk . (5)
Given the system dynamics (3) and the observer (4), the estimation
error dynamics and the residual sequence are governed by the
difference equation:{
ek+1 =
(
A − LC )ek +vk − Lηk − Lδyk + Bδuk ,
rk = Cek + ηk + δ
y
k .
(6)
At this point, having introduced the residual dynamics (6), the main
idea behind residual-based (model-based) attack/fault detection
procedures is to characterize the ‘behavior’ of the residual sequence
a priori in the attack-free case. Then, we can test (in real-time)
whether the actual behavior of the CPS matches the attack-free
one. If it is not the case, alarms are raised indicated a possible
fault/attack on the system. More precisely, the asymptotic density
distribution [47] of the residual sequence is obtained given the
system and observer matrices (A,B,C,R1,R1,L); then, statistical
change detection procedures (e.g., Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) [27,
43], Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR) testing [10], Compound
Scalar Testing (CST) [23], etc.) are employed to test whether the
residual rk , at every time step k , belongs to this distribution. If it
is not the case, alarms are raised. For transparency, we do not go
into further details about these ideas. However, for the interested
reader, we include some extra material about these techniques in
the appendix.
Figure 1: Supervisor model
3 QUANTITATIVE INTEGRITY ANALYSIS ON
CPS
Traditional IT security mechanisms such as authentication and
message integrity are insufficient for CPS security. However, as
stated in [13], the major distinction of control systems with respect
to other IT systems is the interaction with the physical world. In
[25], the authors state that CPSs security is specifically concerned
with attacks that cause physical impact; since IT security mecha-
nisms do not usually account for the physical part of the system,
they are thus ineffective against attacks that either target or exploit
the physical components of CPSs. In this section, we present an
Information Flow (IF) inspired integrity analysis for CPSs which
accounts for the physical process.
3.1 A Discrete Model for CPSs
Figure 1 presents the supervisor model [45], which serves as the
starting point to define an IF framework for CPSs.
The supervisor model consists of four systems: a discrete cyber
system, i.e., the controller, a continuous-time physical system i.e., the
process, and two cyber-and-physical subsystems i.e., the sensor and
the actuator. The controller, whose state is q, receives a digital input
i and produces a digital control signal o which is then transformed
into an analog control signal u by the actuator; in turn, the process,
whose state is x , reacts to u and yields an analog observation y,
which is transformed into the digital input i ′ by the sensor, and the
cycle repeats. Ultimately, our objective is to protect the integrity of
the physical variable observed by y; i.e., (a part of) the state x of
the process.
To formally reason about this model, we define a notion of state
as follows.
Definition 3.1 (States of a CPS). Let i be the vector of digital inputs,
o be the vector of digital outputs, u be the vector of analog control
signals, q be the current state of the controller, x be the current
state of the process, and y be the vector of analog observations. A
state of the CPS is a tuple
σ = ((i,o,u), (q,x),y) (7)
where (i,o,u) is the controllable part of σ , (q,x) is the hidden part of
σ and y is the observable part of σ . We assume that the behaviours
of the actuator and of the sensor are time-invariant; thus we do not
track their state.
Let I be the set of all values that i can take. Similarly, we define
O ,U ,Q ,X andY as the sets of all values that o,u, q x andy can take,
respectively. We define the set of all states Σ = I ×O×U ×Q×X ×Y .
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Figure 2: Water TankModel. We denote valves by ▷◁ and sen-
sors by ⊗.
Example 3.2 (A Water Tank). Consider the water tank with one
input valve and one output valve shown in Figure 2. The tank has
a capacity of L litres of water, and a water level sensor measures
the current level of water in the tank. A very simple LTI model of
the process is
xk+1 = xk + 5uink − 3uoutk , (8)
yk = xk , (9)
subject to 0 ≤ xk ≤ L. If the in valve is open, then 5 litres of water
flow into the tank, and if the out valve is open, then 3 litres of water
flow out the tank. For simplicity, there is no noise, and the only
part of the state that we are interested in is the water level (not
temperature or pressure, for example).
The controller of the tank has a single state ∗, and it receives a
single input i , i.e., the level of the tank in digital format, and issues
an output of the form (oin ,oout )where oin and oout are each either
open or close , which respectively represent the actions of opening
and closing the in and out valves. Opening valve v at time k forces
uvk to be 1 and closing valve v at time k forces u
v
k to be 0. A state
for this system at time k could be ((0, (open, close), (1, 0)), (∗, 3), 3).
Wemodel the behaviour of the sensor, the actuator, the controller
and the process as a set of black-box functions, which we compose
in order to define the dynamics of the CPS.
Definition 3.3 (Single-Cycle Semantics). Let Σ = I ×O ×U ×Q ×
X × Y be the set of states of the CPS. Now, consider the following
functions:
• δIO : Q × I → Q , the transition function of the controller,
• γIO : Q × I → O , the output function of the controller,
• γAD : Y → I , the output function of the sensor,
• γDA : O → U , the output function of the actuator,
• γΦ : X ×U → Y , the output function of the process,
• δΦ : X ×U → X , the transition function of the process.
We define the single-cycle semantics function J·K : Σ → Σ that
describes the evolution of the state ((i,o,u), (q,x),y) of the CPS as
follows J(i,o,u), (q,x),y)K = ((i ′,o′,u ′), (q′,x ′),y′) (10)
where
i ′ = γAD (y), o′ = γIO (q, i), u ′ = γDA(o) (11)
q′ = δIO (q, i), x ′ = δΦ(x ,u) (12)
y′ = γϕ (x ,u). (13)
The evolution over k + 1 cycles is defined by iterating J·K, i.e.,J·Kk+1 = J·K ◦ J·Kk . (14)
3.2 Integrity and Attacker Model
We have yet to consider the presence of an attacker. There are
three non-excluding cases: 1) if an attacker controls a sensor, then
the process IO receives a corrupted version of i , 2) if an attacker
physically controls an actuator, then Φ receives a corrupted version
of u, and 3) if an attacker acts as a Man-in-the-Middle between the
controller and the actuator, then the actuator receives a corrupted
version of o. To formally reason on the impact of such attacks, we
characterise integrity and an attacker model.
Attackers that control all sensor and/or control signals, or that
can change the logic of controller can drive the process to any
state they desire; these attackers are too powerful to defend against.
However, it may happen that an attacker that only controls a subset
of sensors and actuators has enough power to drive the process to
any state they want, and defending against these attackers requires
the implementation of orthogonal controls and/or reimplementa-
tion of the controller’s logic, and is thus desirable to detect these
vulnerabilities at the design phase of the CPS.
Clarkson and Schneider state in [18] that they know of no widely
accepted definition of integrity, but they remark that an “informal
definition seems to be the ‘prevention unauthorized modification
of information’." Clarkson and Schneider use two formal notions to
characterise and quantify corruption, i.e., the damage to integrity.
One notion is contamination, which is a generalisation of taint anal-
ysis that tracks information flows from untrusted inputs to outputs
that are supposed to be trusted. The other notion is suppression,
which occurs when implementation outputs omit information about
correct outputs (with respect to the specification). Contamination
is the dual to information leakage under the Biba duality; however,
there is no apparent Biba dual to suppression [12]. In this work, the
intuition behind corruption is closer to that of contamination, and
we assume that the system presents no suppression; i.e., the CPS
and its components are correctly designed.
Goguen and Meseguer introduced the concept of noninterference
[24], which provides a formal foundation for the specification and
analysis of security policies and the mechanisms to enforce them.
In the case of integrity, noninterference for programs means that a
variation of public inputs does not cause a variation of critical val-
ues. Noninterference is traditionally used to characterise unwanted
flows from a “high/secret” security levelH to a “low/public” secu-
rity level L, as they violate the confidentiality of data; however,
given the Biba duality, in the case of integrity we say that the inputs
of the attacker belong to L, that critical values belong toH , and
that our objective is to prevent unwanted flows from L toH , as
they violate the integrity of data. Noninterference-based confiden-
tiality notions have been formally defined over state-based models
(see [48]), trace-based models (see [17]), and semantics-based mod-
els (see [49]) to name a few. In the following, we define a notion of
(noninterference-based) integrity for CPS using a semantics-based
model.
Definition 3.4 (Attack). Let Σ = I ×O×U ×Q×X ×Y be the set of
states of the CPS. An attack is a function f : I ×O ×U → I ×O ×U
that changes the controllable components of a given state σ of the
CPS. The extension of an attack on a single state can be naturally
extended to an attack over a trace τ = (σ0,σ1, ...) ∈ Σ∗, where the
4
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attacker can apply arbitrary functions fj on each state σi of the
trace.
This definition of attacks is inspired by Equation (2), where
attackers change the value of control signals and measurements.
We remark that these attack functions do not directly change the
current state of the controller nor the state of the process; in-
stead, they attempt to model the interference caused by the at-
tacker at either the cyber or physical level. For instance, if the
CPS is in a state ((i,o,u), (q,x),y), then an attack on a sensor
yields a state ((i ′,o,u), (q,x),y), and an attack on the network layer
that communicates the controller with an actuator yields a state
((i,o′,u), (q,x),y). This interference must propagate in order to
change the state of the controller or the state of the process, which
is why we believe performing an information flow analysis is both
sensible and adequate in this case.
Example 3.5 (Attacking the Water Tank). Consider the water tank
from Example 3.2. An example attack on the water level sensor
is characterised by the function that maps the controllable tuple
(i,o,u) to the tuple (L,o,u); in this case, the attacker is going to fool
the controller into thinking that the water tank is full.
Definition 3.6 (Attacker). Every attacker α controls a set of con-
trollable components, i.e., a set of digital inputs, digital outputs,
and/or analog control signals. We denote the set of the components
that α controls by Cα . The attacker α can perform an attack se-
quence f1, f2, . . . fk over k cycles that changes the semantics of
Equation (14) to J·Kk+1 = J·K ◦ fk ◦ J·Kk . (15)
Example 3.7 (An Attacker of the Water Tank). Consider the water
tank from Example 3.2. An example attacker α that only controls
uin models an attacker that can physically open or close the in
valve at will, and the only means for this attacker to attack the
system is through the physical manipulation of such valve.
The objective of an attacker is to control one or more of the
process variables of the CPS; e.g., an attacker wants to control how
much water is in a tank so that she can overflow it. These physical
variables are represented in our CPS model by the output of the pro-
cess, y, which is a vector of their analogue observations. Ultimately,
our notion of security will depend on the vectory. We now formally
define security based on classical notions of noninterference.
Definition 3.8 (k-Process Integrity for CPSs). Letα be an attacker.We
label each component controlled by α , i.e., c ∈ Cα as L, and we
label all other components of the state asH . We use the expression
lvl(c) to denote the security level of the component c .
Now, let σ and σ ′ be states of the CPS. We say that σ and σ ′
areH -equivalent iff they are equal in allH -labeled components;
formally, we say that σ =H σ ′ iff
∀c ∈ C : lvl(c) = H ⇒ σ (c) = σ ′(c). (16)
We say that σ and σ ′ are process-equivalent, denoted σ ≈Φ σ ′ iff
their process variables are equal; more precisely, if
σ = ((i,o,u), (q,x),y), and (17)
σ ′ = ((i ′,o′,u ′), (q′,x ′),y′), (18)
we say that σ ≈Φ σ ′ iff y = y′.
Finally, for k ∈ N with k > 0, we say that the CPS satisfies k-
process integrity against the attacker α if and only if, for all states σ
and σ ′, we have
σ =H σ ′ ⇒ JσKk ≈Φ Jσ ′Kk . (19)
The previous definition is qualitative (either the system satisfies
process integrity or it does not). However, it does not shed light on
the level of damage that this integrity violation may imply. As with
many security notions based on noninterference, an attacker might
slightly deviate the behaviour of the process without any serious
repercussions; thus, we are interested in a quantitative measure of
security in order to precisely estimate the level of control that the
attacker has over the process.
Definition 3.9 (k-Controllability of an Attacker). Let α be an at-
tacker, let S be the set of states of the CPS, and let σ0 be the initial
state of the CPS. We inductively define the set of states Σkα , for
k ∈ N, by
Σ0α = { σ0 } (20)
Σk+1α =
{ JσK  σ ∈ Σ,σ ′ ∈ Σkα : σ =H σ ′ } . (21)
In other words, for each element σ ′ ∈ Σkα , we find every H -
equivalent state σ , and we include the resulting state JσK in Σk+1α .
Thus, the set Σk+1α contains all reachable states after the kth cycle
accounting for all attacks that α could use against the CPS during
these k cycles (according to the interaction between the attacker
and the system shown in Equation 15).
Now, consider the function πY : Σ → Y that projects the state
((i,o,u), (q,x),y) to y; we use the set
πY (Σk ) =
{
πY (σ )
 σ ∈ Σk } (22)
to determine how many different values for y the attacker α can
force the system to have after k cycles. The k-controllability of α
defined by the number of elements in πY (Σk ), i.e., |πY (Σk )|, quan-
tifies the degree of control that the attacker α has over the process
after a period of k cycles.
Note that this definition, being quantitative, allows us to compare
the impact of different attackers on a CPS over well-defined control
logics. Note also that however, whether this level of controllability
is enough to drive the CPS to a critical state requires an additional
analysis as we will discuss in the following section. Nevertheless,
as in the case of traditional leakage, we observe that higher levels
of controllability (that can be thought of as a dual of leakage, or
corruption), are in general more dangerous, since they imply a
higher degree of separation from the intended “legitimate” state.
We remark that we can show that a system does not satisfy pro-
cess integrity against an attackerα if, for somek , thek-controllability
of α is greater than 1 , as shown in the following Corollary.
Corollary 3.10 (From Controllability to Integrity). Let α
be an attacker. For k ∈ N, if |πY (Σkα )| > 1, then the system does not
satisfy k-process integrity against α .
Proof. If |πY (Σkα )| > 1, then there exist σ ∈ Σ and σ ′ ∈ Σk−1α
with σ =H σ ′ such that JσK 0Φ Jσ ′K. According to Equation (19),
this would imply that the CPS does not satisfy 1-process integrity
against α . □
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We are ultimately interested in using the measure |πY (Σkα )| to
reduce the controllability that the attacker has over the process by
changing the logic of the controller. We will discuss this in Section
4.3 by means of a simple but not trivial case study.
3.3 Composition of CPSs
Cyber-Physical Systems are often distributed systems that compose
several control units supervising certain aspects of the process and
communicating with each other. Thus, it might be possible for an
attacker to attack a physical component in a module of a CPS by in-
terfering with a digital component of a different module. Intuitively,
this requires the existence of channels that enable the propagation
of the interference caused by the attacker from module to module.
These channels can be either digital or physical: when two PLCs
communicate, their message passing opens a digital channel, but
they might also supervise or control a physical “channel” (such as
the same water pipe at different points).
Consider the composition of two modules shown in Figure 3; we
assume that an attacker exists somewhere on the left module, and
her objective is to affect the process variables of the right one. For
that purpose, she will try to propagate her interference through
the channels i∗ (digital) and u∗ (analogue).
Figure 3: Composition framework
To analyse the module on the right of Figure 3, we can extend
its state from ((i,o,u), (q,x),y) to (((i, i∗),o, (u,u∗))(q,x),y); i.e., we
extend the vectors i and u to now consider the new channels. Con-
sequently, we need not compose the two modules in their entirety
to perform an analysis, but only provide additional semantics for
i∗ and u∗ (which could be given by state machines); this opens the
door to a modular analysis of networks of CPSs, which can pro-
vide compositional results under some assumption/commitment
restrictions.
4 CASE STUDY: A WATER DISTRIBUTION
CPS
We now study a simple but illustrative example on how to provide
useful design insights by means of our formal approach.
The following case study is based on an example taken from
[28]. Consider the system shown in Figure 4 which consists of
two water tanks, T1 and T2, both with maximum capacity L. Each
tank has a constant outflow of v1 and v2, respectively. Water is
added to the system at a constant rate w through a hose which,
at any point in time is dedicated to either T1 or T2. We assume
that the hose can switch between the tanks instantaneously, and
we also assume that w ≥ v1 + v2, so it is also possible to close
Figure 4: Case study water distribution system.
the hose to prevent overflowing either tank. The objective of the
controller is to constantly keep the water volume xt above some
time-invariant critical threshold rt , for t = 1, 2. We assume that the
water volumes are both initially above their respective thresholds.
For this purpose, the controller is designed to switch the inflow to
T1 whenever x1 < r1 and to T2 whenever x2 < r2.
The process has three modes: mode q1 where T1 is filling, mode
q2 where T2 is filling, and mode q0 where the hose is closed. The
process evolves as follows when in mode q1{
x1(k + 1) = x1(k) +w −v1,
x2(k + 1) = x2(k) −v2,
(23)
as follows when in mode q2{
x1(k + 1) = x1(k) −v1,
x2(k + 1) = x2(k) +w −v2,
(24)
and as follows when in mode q0{
x1(k + 1) = x1(k) −v1,
x2(k + 1) = x2(k) −v2.
(25)
At time k , the process outputs the vector of analog measurements
(y1(k),y2(k)), defined by
(y1(k),y2(k)) = (x1(k),x2(k)); (26)
in this case, we see that the state is fully observable (though this
might not always be the case). The sensor, at time k , receives the
vector of measurements (y1(k),y2(k)) and outputs the vector of
digital inputs (i1(k), i2(k)), defined by
(i1(k), i2(k)) = (y1(k),y2(k)); (27)
Although it may seem redundant, we explicitly define the semantics
of the sensor for the sake of clarity. In other scenarios, the sensor
may have more complicated semantics; e.g., it could encrypt or sign
the data before sending it to the controller.
The controller, which has a unique state ∗, receives the vector of
inputs (i1, i2) and outputs a command o, defined by
if i1 < r1 then o := q1, (28)
elseif i2 < r2 then o := q2, (29)
else o := q0. (30)
Then, at time k , the actuator translates the command o(k) into the
analog control signal u(k) defined by
u(k) = o(k). (31)
The physical process works as a state machine that reacts to the
control signal u(k) and switches on it to decide how to update the
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state; i.e., if u(k) = qj , then update the state using the equations of
mode qj , for j = 0, 1, 2. This can be clearly represented as a hybrid
automaton (see [28, Figure 1.17]). We now define some attackers
and analyse their impact over this CPS.
4.1 Attackers
We want to determine whether the an attacker can violate the
integrity of the process (according to Definition 3.8), and if so,
quantify the potential impact. This impact will be a natural number,
that will allow us to compare various attackers and assess differ-
ent controllers in terms of security. In order to complement this
quantitative analysis, we will also consider consider four classes of
critical states: for t = 1, 2, when tank Tt is empty (classes E1 and
E2), and when tank i is full (classes F1 and F2).
According to Definition 3.1, states of this CPS have the structure
((i1, i2,o,u), (∗, (x1,x2)), (y1,y2)). For t = 1, 2, we say that the state
σ is a critical state of class Et at time k (i.e., a state where tank i
is empty) iff yt (k) = 0; similarly, we say that σ is a critical state
of class Ft at time k iff yt (k) = L. The system does not reach any
critical state under normal circumstances since the controller is
designed to stabilise the values of y1 and y2 around the thresholds
r1 and r2, respectively. Thus, for t = 1, 2 the normal range of values
for yt is [r−t , r+t ], with r−t ≤ rt ≤ r+t , and we will assume for the
initial value yt (0) that rt ≤ yt (0) ≤ r+t . Note that in general our
assumption is that the controller under analysis has been already
verified to comply with their functional and safety requirements
under normal circumstances (no attackers present).
Let us consider three different attackers:
Attacker α1, who controls the digital control signal o(k), for all k .
Attacker α2, who controls the digital measurement i2(k), for all k .
Attacker α3, who controls the digital measurement i1(k), for all k .
Note that since we want to protect the physical state of the
system (level of the tanks), we do not consider attackers that can
directly tamper with this state, since they will trivially achieve their
goal.
4.2 Quantification and analysis
Using the formal semantics and security properties described above,
it is now possible to carry out a mathematical analysis on the impact
that the three attackers considered can have on the system. Table 1
summarises the results of this analysis. Attacker α1 is very powerful
since she can drive the system to any class of critical state she
wants. Attackers α2 and α3 are very similar to each other in terms
of capabilities, but α3 is more powerful than α2, since α3 can take
the system to three out of the four classes of critical states, while
α2 can only take the system to two classes of critical states. In the
following we sketch manual proofs of these results, and we start to
build arguments for the discussion we carry out in Section 5.
Proof outline: We assume that the initial state is
σ (0) = ((r+1 , r+2 ),q0,q0), (∗, (r+1 , r+2 )), (r+1 , r+2 )), (32)
i.e., a state where the water level of the tank Tt is r+t , for t = 1, 2,
and the hose is closed.
Attacker α1 has control over the digital output o, and she can
choose to replace o(k) with an element of {q1,q2,q0 } for all k . In
Attacker Controls Quantification Vulnerable?
y1 y2 E1 E2 F1 F2
α1 o [0, L] [0, L] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
α2 i2 [r−1 , r+1 ] [0, L] ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓
α3 i1 [0, L] [0, r+2 ] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
Table 1: Quantification of k-controllability of the attackers
for a k that is large enough. We quantify by using ranges to
over-approximate the sets Σkα for the different attackers.
one cycle, we have
Σ1α1 =
{J((r+1 , r+2 ),q0,q0), (∗, (r+1 , r+2 )), (r+1 , r+2 ))K,J((r+1 , r+2 ),q1,q0), (∗, (r+1 , r+2 )), (r+1 , r+2 ))K,J((r+1 , r+2 ),q2,q0), (∗, (r+1 , r+2 )), (r+1 , r+2 ))K}
=
{
((r+1 , r+2 ),q0,q0), (∗, (r+1 −v1, r+2 −v2)), (r+1 −v1, r+2 −v1)),
((r+1 , r+2 ),q0,q1), (∗, (r+1 −v1, r+2 −v2)), (r+1 −v1, r+2 −v1)),
((r+1 , r+2 ),q0,q2), (∗, (r+1 −v1, r+2 −v2)), (r+1 −v1, r+2 −v1))
}
.
(We underline the differences.) Since πy1 (Σ1α1 ) = { r+1 −v1 } and
πy2 (Σ1α1 ) = { r+2 −v2 }, we see that the attack issued by α1 has
not had enough time to propagate to the process. However, after
considering one more cycle, we see that
πy1 (Σ2α1 ) = { r+1 − 2v1, r+1 − 2v1 +w } , (33)
πy2 (Σ2α1 ) = { r+2 − 2v2, r+2 − 2v2 +w } . (34)
We see two different values for y1 because the control signals q0
and q2 prevent the tank T1 from filling (thus making the level of
water r+1 − 2v1) while the control signal q1 causes the hose to fillT1
(making the level of water r+1 −v1 +w). As we extend our analysis
over several cycles (a large enough k), we see that we obtain linear
combinations of vt andw , for t = 1, 2, as follows
πy1 (Σkα1 ) = {y | y = r+1 − βv1 + ϵw, 0 ≤ y ≤ L, β , ϵ ∈ N } , (35)
πy2 (Σkα1 ) = {y | y = r+2 − βv2 + ϵw, 0 ≤ y ≤ L, β, ϵ ∈ N } . (36)
For t = 1, 2, the set πyt (Σkα1 ) includes 0 and L, because there will
be linear combinations r+t − βvt + ϵw that would be less than 0 and
greater than L; however, the level of water in the tankTt cannot go
below 0 and it cannot go above L. For simplicity of exposition, we
over-estimate these sets using the interval [0,L] (see Table 1).
Attacker α2 has control over the digital input i2, and she could
choose to replace i2(k)with an element from the range [0,L] for allk .
However, we see that many choices for i2 trigger similar behaviours
inside the controller. Since there is only one branching depending
on whether i2 < r2, we take 0 and L as the two representative
values for i2 that α2 could use to trigger different behaviours. Thus
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in one cycle, we have
Σ1α2 =
{J((r+1 , r+2 ),q0,q0), (∗, (r+1 , r+2 )), (r+1 , r+2 ))K,J((r+1 , 0),q0,q0), (∗, (r+1 , r+2 )), (r+1 , r+2 ))K,J((r+1 ,L),q0,q0), (∗, (r+1 , r+2 )), (r+1 , r+2 ))K}
=
{
((r+1 , r+2 ),q0,q0), (∗, (r+1 −v1, r+2 −v2)), (r+1 −v1, r+2 −v1)),
((r+1 , r+2 ),q2,q0), (∗, (r+1 −v1, r+2 −v2)), (r+1 −v1, r+2 −v1)),
((r+1 , r+2 ),q0,q0), (∗, (r+1 −v1, r+2 −v2)), (r+1 −v1, r+2 −v1))
}
.
At k = 3, there is finally an impact on the value of y2, and we have
πy1 (Σ3α2 ) = { r+1 − 3v1 } , (37)
πy2 (Σ3α2 ) = { r+2 − 3v2, r+2 − 3v2 +w } . (38)
In this case, the attacker α2 has the same degree of control over y2
that α1 had: α2 can cause the water level ofT2 to rise or decrease at
will (although with slightly more delay). However, there is no flow
of information from i2 to y1, so we the values for y1 correspond
to the values that we we see during the normal execution of the
system over k cycles, i.e., values between r−1 and r
+
1 .
Attacker α3 has control over the digital input i1, and she could
choose to replace i1(k) with an element from the range [0,L] for all
k . The influence of α3 overy1 is clear, since it is dual to the influence
that the attacker α2 had over y2, but we also see an indirect flow
from i1 to y2 due to the way the controller is programmed. More
precisely, whenever i1 < r1, the controller never outputs q2, so it is
possible for the attacker to continuously inhibit the mode q2 by, for
example, making i1 = 0. Consequently, the value r+2 − kv2 would
be an element of πy2 (Σkα3 ). Since the value r+2 − kv2 cannot be less
than 0, whenever r+2 ≤ kv2, we conclude that 0 is an element of
πy2 (Σkα3 ) and that α3 can empty T2. However, no value of i1 forces
the controller to output q2, so α3 cannot arbitrarily increase the
value of y2 beyond its operational upper bound r+2 .
4.3 Redesigning the Controller
In this section, we show how we can reduce the controllability of
the attacker α3 by adding a fairness mechanism to the controller.
Instead of a single mode ∗, we now say that the controller has two.
Letm be a variable that denotes the current mode of the controller,
whose value is eitherm1 orm2. The new controller receives the
vector of inputs (i1, i2) and outputs a command o depending on its
current mode. If the mode ism1 then
if i1 < r1 ∧ i2 < r2 then o := q1,m :=m2, (39)
elseif i1 < r1then o := q1, (40)
elseif i2 < r2 then o := q2, (41)
else o := q0, (42)
and if the mode ism2 then
if i1 < r1 ∧ i2 < r2 then o := q2,m :=m1, (43)
elseif i1 < r1then o := q1, (44)
elseif i2 < r2 then o := q2, (45)
else o := q0. (46)
If the new controller sees that both tanks are below the thresholds
r1 and r2, it will not always prioritise the filling ofT1 as it did before.
We informally justify that the controllability of α3 over the variable
y2 changed, as it is now not possible for the attacker to empty T2.
The tank T2 does not run out of water, because the controller will
fill T2 when it sees that the water level of T2 is below r2 even if the
attacker always tricks the controller into thinking that T1 is empty,
a behaviour that was not present before. However, if the water level
of tank T2 is at its minimum normal value, r−2 , it could happen that
the controller’s mode ism1 at that time, and it will take an extra
cycle to switch from modem1 tom2. During that extra cycle, the
tank T2 loses v2 units of water, so the attacker’s control over y2 is
lower bounded by r−2 −v2, as shown in Table 2. Consequently, the
attacker α3 cannot make the system reach a state where the tank
T2 is empty.
Attacker Controls Quantification Vulnerable?
y1 y2 E1 E2 F1 F2
α3 i1 [0, L] [r−2 − v2, r+2 ] ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗
Table 2: Quantification of the k-controllability of attacker α3
with the new controller in place.
5 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this section, we list and discuss some fundamental discussion
points, some of which represent the basis for interesting future
work.
5.1 Modelling and Abstraction level
Although we provide a formal framework for the modelling of CPSs,
their states, and their execution semantics, and showed evidence
that it can be used to derive useful analysis, it will be a subject
of future work to assess how appropriate our modelling is when
applied to other, perhaps more complex, scenarios. In essence, our
formalism defines a deterministic transition system whose transi-
tion function is given by the one-step cycle semantics function J·K
(see Definition 3.3). Consequently, the notion of integrity that we
use in Definition 3.8 is not probabilistic. However, we believe that
this approach is good enough to carry out an approximate analysis
if the probabilistic nature of the process is due to the existence of
zero-mean noises.
Hybrid automata [7] are state-based models for dynamical sys-
tems. These automata allow the description of invariants and side-
effects on transitions, making them suitable for the description of
many continuous physical processes. There are also model check-
ing techniques for hybrid automata. It would be interesting to see if
these automata provide any advantages when it comes to automatic
verification of the proposed properties.
5.2 Quantification of Interference
For our case study, we came up with a notion of quantification of
integrity violations which, ultimately, was related to how many
unwanted states could an attacker force the system to be in, in other
words the level of corruption an attacker can induce. These metrics
are in a sense dual to metrics used in quantitative information flow,
which measure the entropy of information, and how likely it is
8
Preprint
for an attacker to guess a secret based on the information she has
already observed.
Ideally, we want to quantify the k-controllability of attackers for
large values of k in order to cover as many possible states. Unfor-
tunately, the larger k is, the more computationally demanding the
analysis becomes. However, wewant to highlight that the behaviour
of CPSs is usually regular; i.e., the operation modes of CPSs often
follow the same sequence over and over, revisiting similar states
each time the process repeats. Due to this regular nature, it may be
possible to restrict the analysis to the length of this “behavioural
loop” instead of analysing arbitrarily long traces, therefore consid-
ering a well defined and relatively small k¯ ∈ N.
5.3 A Theory of Attacks and Attackers
From our case study, we observe that it is possible for different
attackers to drive the CPS to critical states by using different attack
strategies. Thus, it may be convenient to define more abstract no-
tions of attack and attacker that are more related to the effects that
we want to avoid on the system in order to bundle together attacks
and attackers that are equally powerful. While we think that our
attacker model is at least as powerful as attacker models commonly
used in control theory (see Section 2.2), further work is indeed to
formally compare them.
5.4 Properties
There are many well-known properties in control theory that char-
acterise important aspects of dynamical systems, including control-
lability, observability, stability and stabilizability. Since we focus
on the protection of the integrity of the process, we want to reduce
the degree of controllability that the attacker has over the system.
A focus on the protection of the confidentiality of data would aim
to reduce the degree of observability that the attacker has over the
system. Krotofil and Larsen acknowledge the importance of rea-
soning about controllability and observability, but they highlight
that it is also important to reason about operability, which is “the
ability to achieve acceptable operations” [30]. Determining how
our notion of process integrity relates to these other properties is
an interesting research topic.
5.5 Proof Automation
From the manual analysis of the case study CPS in the previous
seciton, we foresee that it will be possible to use existing tech-
niques (such as automated theorem proving, model-checking and
SMT solving) to automate parts of the verification. The definition
of the measures for quantification, the notions of critical state, the
attackers and the initial states must naturally be done manually, but
the problem of verification can be reduced to the quantification of
the reachable states by an attacker (similar as in quantitative infor-
mation flow analysis for confidentiality). It would be also interesting
to determine whether our approach together with state-of-the-art
verification tools has advantages over existing control-theoretical
reasoning techniques, which focus on solving algebraic representa-
tions of CPSs.
5.6 Redesign
In our case study, we determined that the attacker α3 was more
powerful than the attacker α2 due to the way the controller was
designed. Thus, we believe that it would be interesting to develop a
methodology for (re)designing controllers that helps avoiding these
type of unsafe behaviours.
6 RELATEDWORK
There is a wealth of work related to the modelling and verification
of Cyber-Physical Systems, mostly with focus on traditional safety
properties: both in the formal sense (properties of a single trace)
and the informal sense (resilience against random faults), see for
instance [6] for a good survey on this field. In the following thus
we focus mostly on formal models of CPSs security.
The applicability of Information Flow Analysis (IFA) to CPS
security has been reinforced by several authors, although many of
the works do not provide definitive results, and other authors focus
on protecting confidentiality and not integrity.
In [26], the Gollmann and Krotofil state that “Physical relation-
ships between the variables in an industrial process, e.g. between
volume, pressure, and temperature in a vessel, can be viewed as
information flows from a modelling perspective,” acknowledging
that it is possible to model physical aspects of CPS using an IF
setting; however, they do not explicitly say how. Gamage et al.
[22] use IFA to illustrate how to prevent attacks on confidentiality
of CPS though the notion of compensating pair (a,ac ), where ac
is an action that cancels the physical manifestation of the earlier
occurring action a so that attackers do not infer that a took place.
Other authors have proposed attacker models for CPSs. For ex-
ample, Howser and McMillin provide in [29] an IF-based attacker
model that builds on top of nondeducibility [51], where attackers
aim to hide information relevant to attacks or faults to the monitor-
ing systems, preventing operators from realising that the behaviour
of the system is anomalous. Given that we our ultimate goal is
to make CPSs more resilient by design, we consider all possible
behaviours that attackers could trigger, so our analysis is not aimed
at deciding whether the attacker hides information from the opera-
tor. Rocchetto and Tippenhauer [46] extend the Dolev-Yao attacker
model [21] to the Cyber-Physical Dolev-Yao (CPDY) model, where
attackers can interact with the physical domain through orthog-
onal channels. We believe that their attackers can be modelled in
our framework with attackers that control the components of the
control vector u, but a formal justification is still missing. From the
perspective of control theory, the work by Weerakkody et al. [56]
proposes the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the distributions
of the attacked and attack-free residuals as a measure for informa-
tion flow to determine to which extent the actions of an attacker
interfere with the system. However, their definition of security is
ultimately tied to a maximum deviation from a prediction model,
while ours is based on semantics-based information flow. Thus,
although we can imagine that both measures are somehow related,
it is not evident what their exact relationship is. In the work by
Murguia et al. [41], the authors characterise the states of the system
that can be reached when under attack, and they try to minimise
this set of reachable states by modifying the mathematical model
of the controller. Their approach to characterise the security of
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the system is purely control-theoretical, while ours is based on
information-flow analysis.
Finally, verification tools like McLaughlin et al.’s [34] that use
symbolic execution for model checking safety properties in PLCs
could help our approach by helping to quantify the interference
of attackers. In sum, to the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to propose the use of a semantics-based approach, inspired
by traditional information-flow analysis techniques used for soft-
ware security, to quantify the impact of attacker actions on process
variables at design time in CPSs.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this work we proposed a formal technique to reason about the
security of Cyber-Physical Systems based on information-flow anal-
ysis and focused on integrity properties. Our basic observation is
that in CPS security often the worst case scenario is related with
the integrity of some physical state (i.e. level of water or chemical
concentration in tank, temperature etc.) and that an attacker’s goal
is to reach that state by manipulating certain digital or physical
inputs to a system (by tampering with one or more sensor or ac-
tuators). As such, we can cast this problem as an information flow
problem and leverage on well-known principles to perform this
analysis. We have illustrated our approach by means of a realistic
case study and showed that we can identify and quantify non-trivial
harmful flows.
In the futurewe plan to perform this reasoning in a semi-automatic
fashion by leveraging on model-checking technology, and we plan
to apply our methodology to a wider range of CPS from various
domains (such as electricity, water treatment).
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Residuals and Hypothesis Testing
Under certain properties of the matrices A and C (detectability
[8]), the observer gain L can be designed such that E[ek ] → 0 as
k →∞ (where E[·] denotes expectation) in the absence of attacks.
Moreover, under the same properties, the covariance matrix Pk :=
E[ekeTk ] converges to steady state (in the absence of attacks) in
the sense that limk→∞ Pk = P exists, see [8]. For δuk = δ
y
k = 0
and appropriately selected L, it can be verified that the asymptotic
covariance matrix P = limk→∞ Pk is given by the solution P of the
following Lyapunov equation:
(F − LC)P(F − LC)T − P + R1 + LR2LT = 0, (47)
where 0 denotes the zero matrix of appropriate dimensions. It is
assumed that the system has reached steady state before an attack
occurs. Consider the residual difference equation in (6). Then, it
can be easily shown that, if there are no attacks, the mean of the
residual is
E[rk+1] = CE[ek+1] + E[ηk+1] = 0m×1, (48)
and its asymptotic covariance matrix is given by
Σ := E[rk+1rTk+1] = CPCT + R2, (49)
where P is the asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimation
error ek solution of (47) and R2 is the sensor noise covariance
matrix. For this residual, we identify two hypotheses to be tested:
H0 the normal mode (no attacks) and H1 the faulty mode (with
faults/attacks). Then, we have
H0 :
{
E[rk ] = 0, and
E[rkrTk ] = Σ,
H1 :
{
E[rk ] , 0, or
E[rkrTk ] , Σ,
The objective of hypothesis testing is to distinguish betweenH0
andH1. Several hypothesis testing techniques can be used to exam-
ine the residual and subsequently detect faults/attacks. For instance,
Sequential Probability Ratio Testing (SPRT) [54, 57], Cumulative
Sum (CUSUM) [27, 43], Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR) testing
[10], Compound Scalar Testing (CST) [23], etc. Each of these tech-
niques has its own advantages and disadvantages depending on the
scenario. Arguably, the most utilised one, due to its simplicity, is a
particular case of CST, called bad-data change detection procedure.
A.2 Attack Detection via Bad-Data Procedure
The input to any detection procedure is a distance measure zk ∈ R,
with k ∈ N, i.e., a measure of how deviated the estimator is from
the sensor measurements. We employ distance measures any time
we test to distinguish betweenH0 andH1. Here, we assume there
is a dedicated detector on each sensor. Throughout the rest of
this section we reserve the index i to denote the sensor/detector,
i ∈ I := {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Thus, we can partition the attacked output
vector as y¯k = col(y¯k,1, . . . , y¯k,m ) where y¯k,i ∈ R denotes the i-th
entry of y¯k ∈ Rm ; then
y¯k,i = Cixk + ηk,i + δ
y
k,i , (50)
with Ci being the i-th row of C and ηk,i and δ
y
k,i denoting the i-th
entries of ηk and δ
y
k , respectively. The bad-data procedure uses the
absolute value of the entries of the residual sequence as distance
measures:
zk,i := |rk,i | = |Ciek + ηk,i + δyk,i |. (51)
If there are no attacks, rk,i follows a normal distribution with zero
mean and variance σ 2i , where σ
2
i denotes the i-th entry of the
diagonal of the covariance matrix Σ. Hence, δyk = δ
u
k = 0 implies
that zk,i = |rk,i | follows a half-normal distribution [47] with
E
[ |rk,i | ] = √2√
π
σi and var
[ |rk,i | ] = σ 2i (1 − 2π ) . (52)
Next, having presented the notion of distance measure, we intro-
duce the bad-data procedure.
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Bad-Data Procedure:
If |rk,i | > αi , k˜i = k, i ∈ I. (53)
Design parameter: threshold αi ∈ R>0.
Output: alarm time(s) k˜i .
The idea is that alarms are triggered if |rk,i | exceeds the threshold
αi . The parameter αi is selected to satisfy a required false alarm
rate A∗i . The occurrence of an alarm in the bad-data when there
are no attacks to the CPS is referred to as a false alarm. Operators
need to tune this false alarm rate depending on the application. To
do this, the thresholds αi must be selected to fulfill a desired false
alarm rate A∗i . LetA ∈ [0, 1] denote the false alarm rate of the bad-
data procedure defined as the expected proportion of observations
which are false alarms, i.e.,Ai := pr[zk,i ≥ αi ], where pr[·] denotes
probability, see [53] and [4].
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